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Introduction
One can readily identify a number of factors that, over the last ten years
or so, have combined to reduce and destabilize the legal status and social
standing of non-citizens who are seeking to enter or remain in Canada.
Particularly conspicuous are the amendments to our refugee and citizenship
laws that were introduced by the government that held power from the 2006
election until 2015, especially those harsh measures that were introduced
after the government obtained a majority in the legislature in 2011.1 The
changes in question were extensive and far-reaching. A shortlist of wellknown examples indicates the scope. Prompted by concerns about fraud,
families have been kept apart by provisions that, for example, rede¿ned
who could sponsor. 2 Prompted by economic reasons, older children were
removed from the list of dependants who could be sponsored, even in
circumstances where they were clearly dependent on their parent.3 Various
1.
The major legislative changes were introduced by Protecting Canada’s Immigration System Act,
SC 2012, c 17; a useful summary and critique of which is found in Amnesty International, Unbalanced
Reforms: Recommendations with respect to Bill C-31 (Brief to the House of Commons Standing
Committee on Citizenship and Immigration) (17 April 2012), online: <www.amnesty.ca/sites/
amnesty/¿les/ai_brief_bill_c_31_to_parliamentary_committee_0.pdf>. In addition, the Strengthening
Canadian Citizenship Act, SC2014, c 22 rendered Canadian citizenship more inaccessible by imposing
both substantive and procedural impediments.
2.
See Immigration and Refugee Protection Regulations, SOR/2002-227, s 130(3) [IRPA Regs],
originally introduced in 2012, which requires a person who has been sponsored as a spouse to be
a permanent resident or citizen for ¿ve years before they can themselves sponsor a person as their
spouse.
3.
The government lowered the cut-off age from 22 to 19 in 2014 (SOR/2014-140, s 2(F)). This age
was selected for the reason that children who came to Canada at an early age were likely to become
wealthier than those who came later. While this age has since been increased once again to a cut-off
of 22 (Regulations Amending the Immigration and Refugee Protection Regulations (Age of Dependent
Children), SOR/2017-60, s 1); the regulation nevertheless continues to deny the dependence of older
children during post-secondary education.
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individuals seeking to remain in Canada have been barred from access
to an independent tribunal in a number of contexts: for instance, those
seeking to avoid deportation who have committed minor offences4 and
asylum seekers who on various grounds cannot appeal denials of their
refugee claims.5 Detention has become a more frequent response to
irregular entry, and in some cases is a mandatory response applying even
to children.6 Health care bene¿ts have been denied to many individuals
with precarious status.7 The list goes on much further. As has been widely
noted, citizenship, permanent residence, temporary residence and refugee
status have all become more dif¿cult to obtain and easier to lose.8
The changes in question were not only far-reaching in substance,
they also took a number of forms, including legislative amendments,9
regulatory changes,10 and a slew of ministerial instructions,11 reviewed
by neither cabinet nor legislature. They were also accompanied by
explanatory backgrounders,12 and government statements that presented
the measures as a response to what was characterized as serious threats to
the integrity of our immigration and refugee regime from queue jumpers,
bogus refugees, fraudsters, as well as from immigrants who brought “nonCanadian values” with them.13 Innuendo and insinuation also magni¿ed

4.
See Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, SC 2001, c 27, s 64(2) [IRPA], appeals to
Immigration Appeal Division unavailable to individuals sentenced to 6 months imprisonment.
5.
Ibid, s 110(2). Some rights of appeals have been restored through litigation: see, YZ v Canada
(Citizenship and Immigration), 2015 FC 892 [YZ].
6.
Ibid, s 55(3.1), mandatory detention for children aged 16 and over who are designated as
“irregular arrivals” under IRPA s 20.1.
7.
Although also restored as a result of litigation. See, Canadian Doctors for Refugee Care v
Canada (Attorney General), 2014 FC 651 [Canadian Doctors].
8.
See, for example, Brief of the Canadian Association of Refugee Lawyers (Brief to the Citizenship
and Immigration Committee of the House of Commons) (5 May 2014), online: <carl-acaadr.ca/sites/
default/¿les/CARL%20C-24%20Brief%20to%20CIMM.pdf>.
9.
Supra note 1.
10. The various regulations are noted in the relevant Annual Reports to Parliament, online: <www.
canada.ca/en/immigration-refugees-citizenship/corporate/publications-manuals.html>.
11. A list of ministerial instructions is available online: <www.canada.ca/en/immigration-refugeescitizenship/corporate/mandate/policies-operational-instructions-agreements/ministerial-instructions.
html>.
12. Backgrounders are archived online: <www.canada.ca/en/immigration-refugees-citizenship/
news/archives.html>.
13. Such statements were widely reported. For example, Sarah Boesveld, “Efforts to keep bogus
Roma refugees out have failed: Jason Kenney,” National Post (22 April 2012), online: <nationalpost.
com/news/canada/efforts-to-keep-bogus-roma-refugees-out-have-failed-jason-kenney>.
See
generally, the Zero Tolerance for Barbaric Cultural Practices Act, SC 2015, c 29 and accompanying
widely reported government comments In addition, in her caustic judgment in Canadian Doctors,
supra note 7, MacTavish J makes several references to remarks from the Minister’s of¿ce prejudging
refugee claims as “bogus.”
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links between immigrants and organized crime and terrorism.14 In addition,
front-line of¿cials, unreviewed by superiors within their organization, were
given a strong mandate to protect national security, and have adopted more
aggressive, less facilitative approaches to those attempting to negotiate
their way through the system.15
Simultaneously, we have witnessed an increase in public expressions
of anti-immigrant sentiment.16 Mainstream political debate has become
infected and inÀuenced in alarming ways by xenophobic invective as
newcomers and temporary workers are misidenti¿ed as a primary source of
various past and present social ills and as a likely source of potential future
harms. Individual non-citizens are attacked because of characteristics they
are deemed falsely to have, or because of characteristics they do have
but that are deemed wrongly to be pernicious. Antagonism to newcomers
may also focus variably and not necessarily consistently on race, religion,
cultural practices, place of origin, language skills and other factors.
It is not unreasonable to talk about the rise of xenophobia and to
suspect that the government’s package of immigration and citizenship
reforms has helped stoke the irrational fears of those who feel threatened
by newcomers and has increased the con¿dence and strength of antiimmigrant groups and organizations. Moreover, it is not unreasonable to
suspect that xenophobes’ irrational fears may have reciprocally inÀuenced
the government’s decision to develop and implement the relevant measures.
It would not be outlandish to conclude that, although each measure of
harsh treatment is directed at a discrete and narrowly de¿ned category
of non-citizen, each measure operates like a single pixel that, only in
combination with many others, presents the viewer with a comprehensible
image. In this case, the cumulative message from the government could be
interpreted as the message that in our immigration processes the interests
of the existing citizenry always come ¿rst and extreme measures may
14. See, for example, Canadian Press, “Kenney blasted for linking Toronto gun violence to ‘foreign
gangsters,’” Vancouver Sun (20 July 2012), online: <www.vancouversun.com/Kenney+blasted+linki
ng+Toronto+violence+foreign+gangsters/6966596/story.html>.
15. See Tony Keller, “Canada Has Its Own Ways of Keeping Out Unwanted Immigrants,” The
Atlantic (12 July 2018), online: <www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2018/07/canadaimmigration-success/564944/>. See also Geoffrey York & Michelle Zilio, “Access Denied: Canada’s
Refusal Rate for Visitor Visas Soars,” Globe & Mail (8 July 2018), online: <www.theglobeandmail.
com/world/article-access-denied-canadas-refusal-rate-for-visitor-visas-soars/>; and Nicholas Keung,
“Audit of immigration detention review system reveals culture that favours incarceration,” Toronto
Star (20 July 2018), online: <www.thestar.com/news/gta/2018/07/21/audit-of-immigration-detentionreview-system-reveals-culture-that-favours-incarceration.html>.
16. See, for example, Craig S Smith & Dan Levin, “As Canada Transforms, an Anti-Immigrant
Fringe Stirs,” New York Times (21 January 2017), online: <www.nytimes.com/2017/01/31/world/
americas/canada-quebec-nationalists.html>.
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be imposed where these interests might be in jeopardy. Each prominent
example of oppressive treatment may be interpreted as aiming to assuage
the general fears of anxious insiders and to respond to their demands.17 A
quick glance at the history of Canadian immigration law18 reveals that this
recent experience is hardly novel. Through the years, nativism, jingoism
and xenophobia have emerged and re-emerged in the public sphere leading
to harsher immigration laws.
In general terms, the recent package of reforms has raised four major
concerns. First, are they gratuitously harsh? Is their serious impact on
various groups necessary to achieve the purposes for which they were
said to be introduced? Do they show adequate concern for the interests of
those directly affected? Second, are they over-inclusive? Are they tailored
suf¿ciently to target only those individuals whose behaviour is considered
problematic, or do they have a negative impact on others who are caught
innocently within the same net? Third, do they impose serious hardship
on some individuals who have merely exercised their rights or who have
failed to meet demanding conditions, solely to deter large numbers of
others from engaging in similar conduct? In other words, are they imposing
unreasonably high burdens on some individuals for reasons of the public
good? Fourth, are they prompted by antagonism towards outsiders, or to
pander to groups within the polity who bear such resentment? There is also
an ancillary concern: whether there is adequate legal redress if a positive
answer can be given to any of these questions.
In response to the package of reforms and the concerns they have
raised, immigration lawyers have not been inactive. They have devised
and maintained important, well-conceived challenges against various legal
provisions. In doing so, they have relied on a familiar set of legal sources
in their attempts to challenge the validity of the measures in question or
to minimize their impact. They have placed signi¿cant reliance both on
established administrative law doctrines and on section 7 of the &DQDGLDQ

17. It should be acknowledged that since 2015, a signi¿cant number of the reforms have been
annulled, both by the courts and by a new government that is more temperate in its rhetoric. However,
while inÀammatory language from of¿cials may have subsided, many of the above-noted changes
have been maintained.
18. The classic source is Ninette Kelley & Michael Trebilcock, 7KH0DNLQJRIWKH0RVDLF, 2nd ed
(Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2010): “…narrow (nativist) conceptions of community…and
ideological hostility to collectivism in the organization of the economy seem largely to explain the
exclusion of Asian and black immigrants, …the refusal to admit Jewish refugees before and during the
Second World War, the internment of Japanese Canadians during the second World War, the screening
out of alleged Communist sympathizers on national security grounds during the 1950’s and 1960s…”
at 464.
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Charter of Rights and Freedoms,19 which guarantees “the right to life,
liberty and security of the person and the right not to be deprived thereof
except in accordance with the principles of fundamental justice.”20
However, lawyers have only rarely relied on other sections of the
Charter when challenging the legal validity of government measures.
Speci¿cally, they have tended to shy away from relying on section 15,
which provides that “every individual is equal before and under the law
and has the right to the equal protection and equal bene¿t of the law without
discrimination and, in particular, without discrimination based on race,
national or ethnic origin, colour, religion, sex, age or mental or physical
disability.” Thus, Charter challenges have not been based on the claim that
our laws or their application have been tainted by xenophobic impulses.
The reluctance of lawyers to rely on this section is not at all mysterious.
Authoritative decisions from the Supreme Court of Canada have, in no
uncertain terms, asserted that laws governing the admission and removal
of non-citizens are virtually immune from section 15 challenge,21 except
in the special case where they single out sub-groups of non-citizens for
negative treatment on pernicious grounds, such as national origin.22
In the following pages, I argue that we should now reconsider these
judicial decisions and promote the view that section 15 should play a
more prominent role in litigation that challenges punitive or excessively
repressive provisions in our regime of immigration laws. Only if we
develop an egalitarian legal doctrine that is rooted in section 15, will we
address all four of the general concerns noted above. Rather than disallow
equality-based challenges to our immigration laws, we should welcome
litigation that seeks to prove the suspicions that our immigration laws
may have been shaped by the inÀuence of xenophobic ideologies which
may, in turn, have been fertilized autopoetically by government laws and
policies. Even where oppressive immigration laws are applicable to all
non-citizens and differentiate them as a class from citizens, we should
welcome a forum for review in which we scrutinize their full impact

19. Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, s 7, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being
Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (UK), 1982, c 11 [Charter].
20. It is interesting to note that on occasion, lawyers also continue to rely on the Canadian Bill of
Rights, SC 1960, c 44. See, Hassouna v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2017 FC
473.
21. The leading cases, discussed below, are Charkaoui v Canada (Immigration and Citizenship),
2007 SCC 9 [Charkaoui] and Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration) v Chiarelli, [1992]
1 SCR 711, 1 RCS 711 [Chiarelli]. See the text accompanying notes 28 and 29, below.
22. See, for example, Canadian Doctors, supra note 7; discussed infra note 75; YZ, supra note 5,
discussed infra note 79; and Tabingo v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2013 FC 377, (FCTD)
[Tabingo]; discussed infra at note 72, aff’d 2014 FCA 191 [Tabingo Appeal] discussed infra at note 74.
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on non-citizens so that we can appraise accurately the actual harms and
bene¿ts and consider government reasons for imposing such rules under
section 1 of the &KDUWHU.23
I do not argue that any speci¿c legal provisions violate section 15.
Such an argument would require more detailed attention to the wider
social, historical and political milieu than space permits. Instead, I operate
at a more general level, arguing that the reasons and premises underlying
the decisions to immunize immigration law from equality challenges are
deeply problematic. Not only are those reasons and premises insuf¿cient
to ground a comprehensive immunity, they are also inconsistent both with
general doctrines of equality that were accepted at the time the decisions
were made and those that have gained currency today. More speci¿cally,
they conÀict with approaches to equality that demand a consideration of
contextual factors, including an appraisal of historical experience, rather
than mere formalistic categorization; they conÀict with decisions that
demand that we examine the actual impact that laws have rather than
their purpose; they conÀict with approaches that look beyond differential
treatment to emphasize that a principle of equal concern and respect should
be regarded as the fundamental principle of analysis; and they conÀict
with approaches that adopt the concept of substantive equality as the basic
fulcrum for analysis.
In addition, recognition of the corrosive effects of xenophobia has
developed and become more widespread since many of these decisions
were made.24 Our experience of anti-immigrant and anti-immigration
polemic within mainstream political discourse and the wide-ranging
ways in which xenophobia reveals itself should alert us to the dangers
of immunization of particular areas of law from egalitarian challenge.25
When nativist views gain currency, it is likelier that xenophobic laws will
be enacted, particularly in the contentious ¿eld of immigration. It should
also be noted that section 7 of the &KDUWHUhas, in many ways, proved to
be an ineffective and unreliable tool to challenge the constitutionality of
23. &KDUWHU, VXSUD note 19, s 1; Where there is a heavy onus is on the government to show that any
infringement of a right is demonstrably justi¿able in a free and democratic society.
24. See, for example, recently signed *OREDO&RPSDFWIRU6DIH2UGHUO\DQG5HJXODU0LJUDWLRQ13
July 2018, online: <www.un.org/pga/72/wp-content/uploads/sites/51/2018/07/migration.pdf.>; which
makes multiple references to xenophobia and reveals high levels of concern about its rise.
25. As reported by Statistics Canada, “After steady but relatively small increases since 2014, policereported hate crime in Canada rose sharply in 2017, up 47% over the previous year, and largely the
result of an increase in hate-related property crimes, such as graf¿ti and vandalism. For the year, police
reported 2,073 hate crimes, 664 more than in 2016. Higher numbers were seen across most types of
hate crime, with incidents targeting the Muslim, Jewish, and Black populations accounting for most
of the national increase.” See, Statistics Canada, “Police-reported hate crime, 2017,” 7KH'DLO\ (28
November 2018), online: <www150.statcan.gc.ca/n1/daily-quotidien/181129/dq181129a-eng.htm>.
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immigration laws.26 It is therefore appropriate to look for other devices
that may offer additional legal protection.
In order to develop these points, I proceed as follows: First, I outline and
analyse critically the decisive passages in the two leading Supreme Court
cases that considered the interplay between section 15 and immigration
law, and effectively closed off avenues for section 15 advocacy within
the ¿eld. A major problem with these cases is that they make no helpful
reference to leading equality decisions beyond the sphere of immigration.
They also promote a concept of discrimination that is less nuanced than
that found in these leading cases. While it is sometimes dif¿cult to fathom
how their terse analysis actually aligns with the decisions in which broader
principles are articulated, it seems clear that the immigration cases are
based on the weak premise that differential treatment between citizens and
non-citizens in the realm of immigration law should not be characterized
as discriminatory on a ground analogous to those enumerated in section
15 and should, as a result, be immune from section 15 challenge. I
attempt to expose the weaknesses of this claim. I then examine other
equality decisions from the same era. These decisions introduced some
important doctrinal claims about the values that should underpin our
concept of discrimination. I argue that these principles are still relevant
and I use these cases to expose further the disingenuous arti¿ce on which
the immigration cases are based. Subsequently, I examine more recent
decisions on equality in which the Supreme Court of Canada has raised
doubts about the mandatory use of comparator groups when determining
whether a person has been treated unequally and has promoted the pursuit
of substantive equality. I suggest that these ideas clash with the approach
taken in the decisions that immunize immigration law from section 15
challenges. I also examine some early decisions in which the Supreme
Court suggests that a broad range of laws are insulated from &KDUWHU
review and suggest that these cases have a narrow ambit that should not
be extended to embrace immigration laws. Finally, I turn to some recent
immigration cases in which current equality principles have been adopted
—cases in which the question is whether differentiation between groups of
non-citizens is discriminatory—to show how they too have failed to take
seriously some key ideas that must be confronted if xenophobia is to be
addressed adequately.

26. See Catherine Dauvergne, “How The Charter has Failed Non-Citizens in Canada: Reviewing
Thirty Years of Jurisprudence” (2013) 58:3 McGill LJ 663; arguing that the principles of fundamental
justice, having been analysed through a lens that places more importance on national security rather
than on basic rights, have been unduly diluted.
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I.

Immunizing immigration decisions from section 15: Interpreting
Charkaoui
A helpful point of entry is the Supreme Court’s decision in Charkaoui,27
a decision that followed closely on the 2006 election and one that dashed
hopes that section 15 of the Charter would provide a set of tools to protect
the interests of non-citizens as they negotiate the immigration process.
In unequivocal terms, the Court denied that the distinction between noncitizen and citizen as found in our immigration and citizenship laws can
ground a section 15 challenge, barring very exceptional circumstances.
The relevant passages should be parsed carefully.
McLachlin C.J. introduces the issue thus:
The appellant Mr. Charkaoui argues that the IRPA certi¿cate scheme
[which can lead to deportation on security grounds] discriminates
against noncitizens, contrary to s. 15(1) of the Charter. However, s. 6 of
the Charter speci¿cally allows for differential treatment of citizens and
noncitizens in deportation matters: only citizens are accorded the right
to enter, remain in and leave Canada (s. 6(1)). A deportation scheme that
applies to noncitizens, but not to citizens, does not, for that reason alone,
violate s. 15 of the Charter : Chiarelli.28

On ¿rst sight, this is an accurate statement of the law. Section 6
does indeed allow for differential treatment29 and indeed, it ensures it by
guaranteeing a package of rights to citizens that is not granted to others.
The fact that non-citizens are denied these rights by virtue of their status

27. Charkaoui, supra note 21.
28. Ibid at para. 129. As explained below, the reference to Chiarelli is signi¿cant. See below, the text
accompanying note 31.
29. Section 6 of the Charter, supra note 19, reads as follows:
6. (1) Every citizen of Canada has the right to enter, remain in and leave Canada.
(2) Every citizen of Canada and every person who has the status of a permanent resident of
Canada has the right
a) to move to and take up residence in any province; and
b) to pursue the gaining of a livelihood in any province.
(3) The rights speci¿ed in subsection (2) are subject to
a) any laws or practices of general application in force in a province other than those that
discriminate among persons primarily on the basis of province of present or previous
residence; and
b) any laws providing for reasonable residency requirements as a quali¿cation for the receipt
of publicly provided social services.
(4) Subsections (2) and (3) do not preclude any law, program or activity that has as its object
the amelioration in a province of conditions of individuals in that province who are socially
or economically disadvantaged if the rate of employment in that province is below the rate of
employment in Canada.
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is, thus, not a matter that can be challenged constitutionally.30 However,
McLachlin C.J.’s words do seem to provide non-citizens with the
possibility of a successful challenge in some circumstances. The inclusion
of the phrase “for that reason alone” should give us pause. We should note
its various possible meanings and from these, select one that ¿ts best.
On the one hand, the phrase suggests that if non-citizens can identify
an offensive aspect of the deportation scheme that has a profound impact
on their interests then they might be able to successfully mount a challenge
that the differential treatment that they are accorded, compared to that
accorded to citizens, can amount to a violation of section 15. Under
this reading, the Court would not be seeking to immunize the ¿eld from
challenge. Instead, it would merely be adding a further demand to litigants:
show us that there is something going on here that is more than the mere
creation of a set of rules de¿ning who has access to the country. In other
words, a claimant who, for example, showed that rules about entry and
residence imposed oppressive or unfair conditions, or who revealed that
the rules were created by a political party that regularly engaged in the
vili¿cation of non-citizens might succeed. Within a speci¿c context, the
oppressiveness of a condition attached to a law that does not apply to
citizens might provide the required additional reason that would permit a
court to ¿nd that the scheme in question violated section 15.
However, a closer reading of the whole text reveals that this is not
what is intended here. Ultimately, it becomes clear that, with one very
small exception, non-citizens are always to be denied the opportunity to
challenge immigration schemes if their claim pivots on differential treatment
between non-citizens and citizens. The court is stating that, in such cases,
there is suf¿cient reason to bar an equality challenge. For a non-citizen
to successfully challenge a deportation scheme as discriminatory, that
scheme would also have to differentiate on other grounds. For example, it
would need to differentiate among non-citizens on grounds such as ethnic
origin or religion or other analogous or enumerated grounds.
The reference to &KLDUHOOL is the ¿rst indicator that this latter
interpretation is the correct one. The relevant passage in Sopinka J.’s
judgment reads as follows:

30. I do not consider here the argument that the Constitution, by guaranteeing rights to citizens, is
not guaranteeing them exclusively to citizens. According to this argument, in special circumstances,
various non-citizens may have a constitutional right to enter or remain in the country. Such an
argument has not fared well in the courts. See 6ROLVY&DQDGD &LWL]HQVKLSDQG,PPLJUDWLRQ), [2000]
FCJ No 407, 186 DLR (4th) 512. Nevertheless, I believe that its full merit has been underappreciated.
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While permanent residents are given various mobility rights in s.
6(2), only citizens are accorded the right to enter, remain in and leave
Canada in s. 6(1). There is therefore no discrimination contrary to s. 15
in a deportation scheme that applies to permanent residents, but not to
citizens.31 [emphasis added]

Sopinka J.’s categorical conclusion that there is no discrimination is
based on the understanding that a differentiation will be discriminatory
only if it is made on one of the grounds listed in section 15 or an analogous
ground. He is not here cataloguing all the factors that are required to show
that a distinction is discriminatory. Instead, he is identifying a preliminary
¿nding that must be made before the inquiry can continue. He is asserting
that one can decide that differentiation is not discriminatory merely by
¿nding that the distinction is neither enumerated nor analogous. Because
he is attempting to show that a deportation scheme is not discriminatory,
Sopinka J. does not pursue an inquiry into any additional factors,
presumably because he thinks that it is unnecessary to do so. Because
the distinction between citizen and non-citizen is authorized in a speci¿c
context, the differentiation is not based on a proscribed ground. Citizenship
status, if it relates to the immigration process, is neither enumerated nor
analogous. This terminates the section 15 inquiry at an early point.
Not only does McLachlin C.J. adopt Sopinka J.’s explanation of
discrimination, she also adds Àesh to the skeleton by adding extra caveats:
….there are two ways in which the IRPA could, in some circumstances,
result in discrimination. First, detention may become inde¿nite as
deportation is put off or becomes impossible, for example because there is
no country to which the person can be deported. Second, the government
could conceivably use the IRPA not for the purpose of deportation, but
to detain the person on security grounds. In both situations, the source of
the problem is that the detention is no longer related, in effect or purpose,
to the goal of deportation.
In Re A, the legislation considered by the House of Lords expressly
provided for inde¿nite detention; this was an important factor leading
to the majority’s holding that the legislation went beyond the concerns
of immigration legislation and thus wrongfully discriminated between
nationals and non-nationals…Even though the detention of some of the
appellants has been long—indeed, Mr. Almrei’s continues—the record
on which we must rely does not establish that the detentions at issue have
become unhinged from the state’s purpose of deportation…. [emphasis
added]32
31. Chiarelli, supra note 21 at para 32.
32. Charkaoui, supra note 21 at paras 130, 131. The Reference to Re A is a reference to A v Secretary
of State for the Home Department, [2005] 3 All ER 169, [2004] UKHL 56.
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7KHWZRSRLQWVIRXQGLQWKLVH[FHUSWVKRXOGEHFRQVLGHUHGLQUHYHUVH
RUGHU,QERWKFDVHV0F/DFKOLQ&-LVFODLPLQJWKDWZKHQZHKDYHOHIW
WKHUHDOPRILPPLJUDWLRQWKHSRVVLELOLW\IRUD¿QGLQJRIGLVFULPLQDWLRQ
UHHPHUJHV,QWKHVHFRQGSRLQWVKHLVFODLPLQJWKDWWKDWZKHUHDFRXUW
UXOHVWKDWDPHDVXUHKDVQRWEHHQLQWURGXFHGWRDFKLHYHDSXUSRVHUHODWHG
WRLPPLJUDWLRQEXWWRDFKLHYHDTXLWHGLIIHUHQWJRDOLWPD\WKHQFRQVLGHU
ZKHWKHU LW LV GLVFULPLQDWRU\ :KHUH D SHUVRQ KDV EHHQ GHWDLQHG VROHO\
IRU QDWLRQDO VHFXULW\ UHDVRQV ZH ZLOO QRW KDYH HQWHUHG WKH UHDOP RI
GHSRUWDWLRQ*HQHUDOO\VSHDNLQJRQO\ZKHUHWKHJRYHUQPHQWLVSXUVXLQJD
SXUSRVHWKDWLVUHODWHGWRLPPLJUDWLRQZLOODGLVDGYDQWDJHWKDWLVLPSRVHG
RQO\RQDQRQFLWL]HQEHIRXQGQRWWREHGLVFULPLQDWRU\2QWKHRWKHUKDQG
ZKHUH WUHDWPHQW DFFRUGHG WR DQ LQGLYLGXDO LV XQUHODWHG WR WKH SXUSRVHV
RI GHSRUWDWLRQ WKH LPPXQL]DWLRQ SURYLGHG E\ WKH VXEMHFW PDWWHU RI WKH
OHJLVODWLRQZLOOQRORQJHUDSSO\DQGLWPD\EHIRXQGWREHGLVFULPLQDWRU\
:HVKRXOGSDXVHWRQRWHWKHIXOOPHDQLQJRIWKLVDQDO\VLV:KHUHWKH
OHJLVODWLYHSXUSRVHXQGHUO\LQJDPHDVXUHLVWKDWRIUHJXODWLQJLPPLJUDWLRQ
WKLV ZLOO EH VXI¿FLHQW WR VKRUW FLUFXLW DQ\ IXUWKHU LQTXLU\ ,Q SDUWLFXODU
LWZLOOFLUFXPYHQWWKHQHHGWRPDNHLQTXLULHVLQWRWKHDFWXDOHIIHFWVWKDW
WKH PHDVXUH KDV KDG RU LV OLNHO\ WR KDYH RQ VSHFL¿F LPPLJUDQWV 7KLV
LV SUREOHPDWLF EHFDXVH DV LV QRWHG EHORZ HTXDOLW\ MXULVSUXGHQFH KDV
SODFHGLQFUHDVLQJOHYHOVRIHPSKDVLVRQWKHQHHGWRFRQGXFWVXFKHIIHFWV
EDVHGLQTXLULHV7KHJHQHUDOWKUXVWRIWKDWMXULVSUXGHQFHLVWKDWZHVKRXOG
ORRNEH\RQGIRUPDOGLVWLQFWLRQVWRGLVFRYHUZKDWWKHVXEVWDQWLYHLPSDFW
RIODZLV
1RZWXUQLQJWRWKH¿UVWSRLQWPDGHLQWKHSDUDJUDSKTXRWHGDERYH
LWVKRXOGEHFRQFHGHGWKDWWKHUHLVDQDWWHPSWKHUHWRLQFOXGHDQHIIHFWV
EDVHGDQDO\VLVRIGLVFULPLQDWLRQDVSDUWRIWKHLQTXLU\EXWLWLVDWPRVW
KDOIKHDUWHGDQGGRHVQRWSURYLGHDVROLGIRXQGDWLRQIRUWKHFRQFHSWLRQRI
GLVFULPLQDWLRQWKDWLVEHLQJSURPRWHG:KHQLWEHFRPHVLPSRVVLEOHIRUWKH
JRYHUQPHQWWRDFKLHYHLWVVWDWHGLPPLJUDWLRQSXUSRVHWKURXJKWKHPHDVXUHV
LQ TXHVWLRQ WKDW SXUSRVH FHDVHV WR SURYLGH WKH UHTXLUHG LPPXQL]DWLRQ
IURPVHFWLRQFKDOOHQJH7KHPHDVXUHVLQTXHVWLRQZKDWHYHUWKHLUVWDWHG
 7KHLGHDWKDWWKHGLVFULPLQDWRU\QDWXUHRIDODZVKRXOGGHSHQGRQZKHWKHULWVSXUSRVHUHODWHVWR
WKH¿HOGRILPPLJUDWLRQUDLVHVDKRVWRISUREOHPV'HWHUPLQLQJDODZ¶VSXUSRVHLVRIFRXUVHQRWRULRXVO\
GLI¿FXOW%XWPRUHLPSRUWDQWGHFLGLQJWKDWDPDWWHU³UHODWHVWRLPPLJUDWLRQ´ZLOOEHFRQWHQWLRXV'RHV
WKH LPSRVLWLRQ RI D ZRUN SHUPLW UHODWH WR LPPLJUDWLRQ RU HPSOR\PHQW" 'RHV GHQLDO RI DFFHVV WR D
SURIHVVLRQWRSHUPDQHQWUHVLGHQWVUHODWHWRLPPLJUDWLRQ(YHQLIWKH¿HOGRILPPLJUDWLRQLVGH¿QHGWR
HPEUDFHRQO\WKHULJKWVWRHQWHULQWRUHPDLQLQDQGGHSDUWIURP&DQDGDWKHLPSRVLWLRQRIUHVWULFWLRQ
RQZRUNKRXVLQJKHDOWKHGXFDWLRQPD\EHVHHQDVRQHWKDWLVGH¿QLQJWKHDPELWWRWKHULJKWWRUHPDLQ
7KHVHDUHWKRUQ\SUREOHPVWKDWDUHQRWHGEXWQRWGLVFXVVHGIXUWKHU
 /DZY&DQDGD 0LQLVWHURI(PSOR\PHQW ,PPLJUDWLRQ >@6&5'/5 WK DW
SDUD>/DZ@
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purpose, cease to create the immunization because a court is justi¿ed in
¿nding that they do not relate to deportation because of the absence of any
effective way for it to contribute to that end.
The important point to note is that McLachlin C.J. is claiming that when
an underlying immigration purpose may still be achieved, the seriousness
of its impact on the individual is totally irrelevant to the determination that
it is not discriminatory. Thus, while the impact of lengthy detention on Mr.
Almrei was recognized to be severe, achieving the government’s purpose
of deportation was still characterized as within the realm of the possible.
Since deportation has not become impossible, the detention could be
characterized as part and parcel of the process of removal and therefore
could not be considered to be discriminatory, no matter how repressive.
Although she does not cite it, it is likely that the Chief Justice had
in mind the general approach to discrimination cases that had been
developed by Iacobucci J. speaking for the Court in the case of /DZ Y
&DQDGD(0LQLVWHURI(PSOR\PHQW ,PPLJUDWLRQ)35 a few years previously.
Iacobucci J. summarized the approach as follows:
Accordingly, a court that is called upon to determine a discrimination
claim under s. 15(1) should make the following three broad inquiries:
(A) Does the impugned law (a) draw a formal distinction between the
claimant and others on the basis of one or more personal characteristics,
or (b) fail to take into account the claimant’s already disadvantaged
position within Canadian society resulting in substantively differential
treatment between the claimant and others on the basis of one or more
personal characteristics?
(B) Is the claimant subject to differential treatment based on one or more
enumerated and analogous grounds?
and
(C) Does the differential treatment discriminate, by imposing a burden
upon or withholding a bene¿t from the claimant in a manner which
reÀects the stereotypical application of presumed group or personal
characteristics, or which otherwise has the effect of perpetuating or
promoting the view that the individual is less capable or worthy of
recognition or value as a human being or as a member of Canadian
society, equally deserving of concern, respect, and consideration?36

The decision in &KDUNDRXL is reached by addressing the second of
these points. The deportation scheme in question imposes substantively
differential treatment between the claimant and others, but the treatment
35.
36.

/DZLELG
,ELG at para 88.
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is not “based on one or more enumerated and analogous grounds.” One’s
status as a non-citizen cannot count as an analogous ground when the
differentiation in question relates to the immigration or removal process.
The fact that the Charter itself permits such differentiation provides
foundational support for this conclusion. In essence, the underlying
argument seems to be that, if we were to recognize lack of citizenship
status as a ground of discrimination, we would be unable to produce a
body of immigration law. Indeed, we would be unable to develop a regime
that treated citizens and non-citizens differently.37
II. The Tension between Charkaoui and Andrews38
On their face, the views expressed by McLachlin C.J. and Sopinka J.
are perplexing. One should remember that in Andrews v. Law Society of
British Columbia, the leading precedent at the time Chiarelli was decided,
the Supreme Court had held that non-citizens fall into a category analogous
to those speci¿cally enumerated in s. 15. To distinguish between citizens and
non-citizens is to differentiate on a prohibited ground. Wilson J. memorably
offers the following explanation:
Relative to citizens, non-citizens are a group lacking in political power
and as such vulnerable to having their interests overlooked and their
rights to equal concern and respect violated. They are among “those
groups in society to whose needs and wishes elected of¿cials have no
apparent interest in attending”: see J. H. Ely, Democracy and Distrust
(1980), at p. 151. Non-citizens, to take only the most obvious example,
do not have the right to vote….I would conclude therefore that noncitizens fall into an analogous category to those speci¿cally enumerated
in s. 15. I emphasize, moreover, that this is a determination which is not
to be made only in the context of the law which is subject to challenge but
rather in the context of the place of the group in the entire social, political
and legal fabric of our society. While legislatures must inevitably draw
distinctions among the governed, such distinctions should not bring
about or reinforce the disadvantage of certain groups and individuals
by denying them the rights freely accorded to others.39 [emphasis added]

The emphasized passage suggests that you cannot pick and choose
contexts in which to make the determination that non-citizens are
particularly vulnerable, lack political power and are therefore at risk of
37. In Lavoie v Canada, [2002] 1 SCR 769 [Lavoie], it was argued unsuccessfully that recognizing
immigration status as a ground analogous to those listed in section 15 in any ¿eld would “negate or
abolish the concept of citizenship.” The majority noted at para 39, “As [the respondents] put it, “[b]y
universal de¿nition and by constitutional ¿at, …citizens and non-citizens are unequal in status.” This
case is discussed infra in the text accompanying note 46.
38. Andrews v Law Society of British Columbia, [1989]1 SCR 143, 56 DLR (4th) 1 [Andrews].
39. Ibid at para 5.
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suffering abuse. It is this general vulnerability in every social context
(including the realm of immigration and deportation) that leads to the
conclusion that non-citizen status is analogous to the grounds enumerated
in section 15. The determination that non-citizens fall into an analogous
category is not context dependent. If it is non-citizens’ vulnerability that
exposes them to the risk of abusive treatment and that therefore justi¿es a
close scrutiny of their treatment comparative to how citizens are treated,
then the ¿eld of immigration law should not be considered exceptional.
In response to this powerful explanation, the reasoning of McLachlin
C.J. and Sopinka J. appears to be syllogistic in nature:
(1) Deportation schemes that differentiate only between citizens and
non-citizens40 are authorized by the Constitution.
(2) This is a deportation scheme that differentiates only between
citizens and non-citizens.
(3) This scheme is authorized by the Constitution.
The fallacy in this logic can be exposed by noting that the guarantees
found in section 6 of the &KDUWHU do not provide any logical answer to
the question whether the distinction between citizens and non-citizens
in this context is discriminatory. If, when considering the constitutional
provision, one keeps in mind the three-part schema adopted in /DZ, one
can readily identify that different interpretations of section 6 are possible.
One option is, indeed, the one that is selected by McLachlin C.J.: it is
not unconstitutional to provide different packages or rights to citizens and
non-citizens in the immigration context because in that context it is not
discriminatory to make such a differentiation.
However, a second option is to hold that, while sets of rules de¿ning
entry and removal that distinguish between citizen and non-citizen are not
for that reason alone invidious, it is open to a litigant to show that the
particular instance in question does discriminate. This option would bring
into play the factors identi¿ed in the third part of the schema outlined in
/DZ: since the burden placed upon non-citizens by deportation schemes,
considered in the abstract, does not SHUVHhave the effect of perpetuating
or promoting the view that the individual is less capable or worthy of
recognition they are not presumptively discriminatory. However, it would
be open to a non-citizen to show that any particular deportation scheme
would have that effect. Such proof could rebut any presumption. A noncitizen could claim with justi¿cation that while they do not have a right
not to be deported, they do have a right that the deportation process be
conducted according to high standards of treatment and in a respectful
40.

As opposed to schemes that distinguish among different categories of non-citizen.
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PDQQHU 8QGHU WKLV LQWHUSUHWDWLRQ DQ DEXVLYH RU QHHGOHVVO\ RSSUHVVLYH
LPPLJUDWLRQODZWKDWIDLOVWRJLYHDGHTXDWHZHLJKWWRWKHLQWHUHVWVRIWKH
QRQFLWL]HQ FRXOG EH LGHQWL¿HG DV GLVFULPLQDWRU\ :KLOH WKH GLVWLQFWLRQ
EHWZHHQ FLWL]HQ DQG QRQFLWL]HQ LQ D ODZ WKDW LV SDUW RI DQ LPPLJUDWLRQ
VFKHPHPD\QRWEHVXVSHFWRQLWVIDFHIXUWKHULQTXLU\PD\VKRZWKDWLW
LVLQGHHGVR7KHQRQFLWL]HQOLWLJDQWZRXOGQRWHWKDWWKHODZLQTXHVWLRQ
LVQRWPHUHO\DKDUVKODZWKDWDSSOLHVWRHYHU\RQH,WLVDKDUVKODZWKDW
GRHVQRWDSSO\WRFLWL]HQV,WLVWKHFRPELQDWLRQRIWKHKDUVKQHVVDQGWKH
UHFRJQL]HGKLVWRULFDOSUHMXGLFHVXIIHUHGE\QRQFLWL]HQVWKDWZRXOGSHUPLW
XVWRODEHOLWGLVFULPLQDWRU\
7KXV LI RQH UHGXFHV WKH UHDVRQLQJ WR D V\OORJLVP WKH FRQFOXVLRQ
VKRXOGQRWEHWKHRQHDWWULEXWHGDERYHWR0F/DFKOLQ&-DQG6RSLQND-
,QVWHDGLWVKRXOGEH
 7KLVVFKHPHLVDXWKRUL]HGunless it is shown to be discriminatory.
6\OORJLVPDORQHFDQQRWJURXQGWKHLPPXQL]DWLRQRIDQLPPLJUDWLRQ
VFKHPHIURPDVHFWLRQFKDOOHQJH
2QHFDQWLHWKHVHSRLQWVGLUHFWO\WRWKHH[FHUSWVIURPCharkaoui FLWHG
DERYH 0F/DFKOLQ &- FRQQHFWV WKH LPPXQL]DWLRQ ZLWKLQ WKH VSKHUH RI
LPPLJUDWLRQ WR WKH JRYHUQPHQW¶V SXUSRVH 6KH RPLWV WR FRQVLGHU D FDVH
ZKHUHWKHUHDUHPXOWLSOHDLPVRQHWRHVWDEOLVKDQLPPLJUDWLRQUHJLPHDV
ZHOODVRWKHUVWKDWDUHPRUHQHIDULRXV)RUH[DPSOHZKHUHWKHUHDUHWZR
XQGHUO\LQJSXUSRVHVWKH¿UVWRIZKLFKLVWRGH¿QHDGHSRUWDWLRQVFKHPH
DQGWKHVHFRQGRIZKLFKFRXOGEHWRHQVXUHWKDWWKHVFKHPHZLOOVDWLVI\
[HQRSKRELF ]HDORWV E\ VKRZLQJ KLJK OHYHOV RI GLVGDLQ IRU QRQFLWL]HQV
DQHTXDOLW\FKDOOHQJHZLOOSUHVXPDEO\QRWVXFFHHG,Q0F/DFKOLQ&-¶V
HVWLPDWLRQEHFDXVHVXFKDUHJLPHZRXOGQRWEH³XQKLQJHGIURPWKHVWDWH¶V
SXUSRVH RI GHSRUWDWLRQ´ VXFK XOWHULRU SXUSRVHV ZRXOG QRW QHJDWH WKH
LPPXQL]DWLRQEXWWKH\FRXOGUHYHDODQXQMXVWL¿DEO\QHJDWLYHDWWLWXGHWR
QRQFLWL]HQVDQGKDYHDQXQGXHLPSDFWRQWKHP
)XUWKHUPRUH ZKHUH WKHUH LV DQ LPPLJUDWLRQ SXUSRVH EHKLQG D
JRYHUQPHQWUHJLPHEXWWKHUHDUHVHULRXVFROODWHUDODQGXQLQWHQGHGLPSDFWV
RQWKHLQGLYLGXDO0F/DFKOLQ&-¶VDQDO\VLVSRVLWVWKDWWKLVVKRXOGKDYH

 7KLVSRLQWLVPDGH in Quebec (Attorney General) v A,6&&>@6&5>AG v
A@ DW SDUD  ZKHUH LW LV VWDWHG ³ZKHUH WKH GLVFULPLQDWRU\ HIIHFW LV VDLG WR EH WKH SHUSHWXDWLRQ
RI GLVDGYDQWDJH RU SUHMXGLFH HYLGHQFH WKDW JRHV WR HVWDEOLVKLQJ D FODLPDQW¶V KLVWRULFDO SRVLWLRQ RI
GLVDGYDQWDJHRUWRGHPRQVWUDWLQJH[LVWLQJSUHMXGLFHDJDLQVWWKHFODLPDQWJURXSDVZHOODVWKHQDWXUH
RIWKHLQWHUHVWWKDWLVDIIHFWHGZLOOEHFRQVLGHUHG´7KLVDQDO\VLVLVH[SORUHGLQGHWDLOLQCanadian
Doctors,supraQRWHDWSDUDV
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no bearing on the conclusion that the regime is not discriminatory.42
Assuming that the government can achieve its purpose, it is that purpose
rather than its impacts that determines that we are in the zone of immunity.
Thus, as will be shown in further detail below, the approach is antithetical
to approaches that advocate that inquiries into discrimination should be
effects-based rather than merely purpose-based.43
In the remaining pages of this paper, I present three major reasons for
rejecting the Charkaoui/Chiarelli approach.
First, the approach does not easily co-exist either with the general
jurisprudence on equality that was current at the time Charkaoui was
decided, or with the judicial doctrine that has developed since then.
Second, it fails to recognize and address the full impact of xenophobia
as a signi¿cant social problem. And third, it has had a negative impact
on judicial reasoning in those few immigration cases where judges have
concluded that the section 15 rights of various groups of noncitizens have
been infringed.
I address each of these in turn.
III. The tension between Charkaoui and early equality jurisprudence
The oddness of the decisions in Charkaoui and Chiarelli becomes
noticeable when one looks ¿rst at analyses of discrimination found in
other cases of the same vintage. I can make my point by adverting to two
such cases—Law and Lavoie.
In Law, the Court had insisted vigorously that equality analysis “is to
be undertaken in a purposive and contextualized manner.” Moreover, it
revealed and traced out the basic purpose underlying section 15 as follows:
It may be said that the purpose of s. 15(1) is to prevent the violation
of essential human dignity and freedom through the imposition of
disadvantage, stereotyping, or political or social prejudice, and to
promote a society in which all persons enjoy equal recognition at law as

42. As Colin Grey pointed out to me, it is fruitful to distinguish McLachlin CJ’s views on section
15 with those that she expresses on section 7. Here, she is making the claim that an immigration
law is immunized from section 15 challenge no matter how serious the harm incurred. In relation
to section 7, she notes, “Medovarski thus does not stand for the proposition that proceedings related
to deportation in the immigration context are immune from s. 7 scrutiny. While the deportation of
a non-citizen in the immigration context may not in itself engage s. 7 of the Charter, some features
associated with deportation, such as detention in the course of the certi¿cate process or the prospect of
deportation to torture, may do so.” Charkaoui, supra note 21 at para 17.
43. In Withler v Canada (Attorney General), 2011 SCC 12 at para 39 [Withler]. This point is made
clearly: “The focus of the inquiry is on the actual impact of the impugned law, taking full account of
social, political, economic and historical factors concerning the group.”Also in AG v A, supra note 41
at para 319, Abella J. quotes McIntyre J. in Andrews: “[T]he main consideration must be the impact of
the law on the individual or the group concerned.”
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human beings or as members of Canadian society, equally capable and
equally deserving of concern, respect and consideration.44

The &KDUNDRXL&KLDUHOOLapproach, by maintaining that any rational
connection between the treatment and immigration goals is suf¿cient to
halt a s. 15 challenge in its tracks before considering whether essential
human dignity has been violated adopts a return to formalistic tendencies
that are inconsistent with the general contextualizing approach advocated
in /DZand further emphasized in later cases. No matter how oppressive
our immigration laws, no matter how much disdain they reveal for those
seeking to enter and remain in Canada, they are immune from being
considered discriminatory, on the ground that the distinction between
citizen and non-citizen is a pre-requisite for any immigration process to
get off the ground. These contextual factors are seemingly irrelevant when
determining whether an immigration measure is discriminatory. While it
may be accepted for the purpose of argument that drawing a distinction
between citizen and non-citizen may not in itself interfere with the
promotion of “a society in which all persons enjoy equal recognition at
law as human beings” any speci¿c iteration of that distinction even in the
realm of immigration law may do so. A clear example would be where
immigrants are mandatorily separated from their children at the border and
deported without them (as they have recently been in the United States).
Also, in /DZ the Court discusses how comparator groups should be
selected;
To locate the appropriate comparator, we must consider a variety of
factors, including the subject-matter of the legislation. The object
of a s. 15(1) analysis is not to determine equality in the abstract; it is
to determine whether the impugned legislation creates differential
treatment between the claimant and others on the basis of enumerated
or analogous grounds, which results in discrimination. Both the purpose
and the effect of the legislation must be considered in determining the
appropriate comparison group or groups. Other contextual factors may
also be relevant. The biological, historical, and sociological similarities
or dissimilarities may be relevant in establishing the relevant comparator
in particular, and whether the legislation effects discrimination in a
substantive sense more generally….45

The decision to proscribe using citizens as a comparator group when
immigration laws are at issue ZLWKRXWORRNLQJDWWKHHIIHFWVRIDSDUWLFXODU

44.
45.

/DZVXSUD note 34 at para 51.
,ELG at para 57.
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law is incompatible with this analysis which emphasizes examining the
effect of legislation when determining the relevant group.
In Lavoie, Bastarache J., for the majority, adverts to a tension between
Chiarelli and Andrews:
This case has much in common with both Andrews and Chiarelli. Like
Andrews, it involves differential treatment in employment that is not
explicitly authorized by the Charter; like Chiarelli, it involves a federal
law that is part of a recognized package of privileges conferred on
Canadian citizens. This combination of factors makes it dif¿cult to decide
whether, at the end of the day, the law conÀicts with the purpose of s.
15(1) of the Charter. Based on this Court’s recent s. 15(1) jurisprudence,
I conclude that it does.46

Bastarache J. begins his analysis by noting that the case looks as if it
is straightforward and calls for an uncontroversial application of Andrews:
the impugned law draws a clear distinction between citizens and noncitizens, and the latter constitutes an analogous ground of discrimination
under s. 15(1): see Andrews…47

However, an argument from the respondents gives him pause:
Nevertheless, the respondents argue that the whole point of federal
citizenship legislation is to treat citizens and non-citizens differently, and
therefore that the two groups cannot validly be compared for s. 15(1)
purposes. As they put it, “[b]y universal de¿nition and by constitutional
¿at, …citizens and non-citizens are unequal in status. To treat them
equally would be to negate or abolish the concept of citizenship”….In
their view, however, such a comparison is not appropriate in the case
of “a citizenship de¿ning law that draws a constitutionally permitted
distinction between citizens and non-citizens.” In such a case, the s.
15(1) analysis would undermine the fundamental difference between
citizens and non-citizens…48

To address this concern, Bastarache J. focuses ¿rst on the use of
citizenship as a comparator group and on the proper stage in the analysis
that this should occur:
Whether citizens are an appropriate comparator in this case is, in my
view, better dealt with as a contextual factor under the third branch of
the Law analysis than as a bar to recognizing a legislative distinction.
Although Iacobucci J. stressed the importance of identifying an
appropriate comparator group, there is nothing in Law to indicate that the
46.
47.
48.

Lavoie, supra note 37 at para 37.
Ibid at para 39.
Ibid.
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¿UVWLQTXLU\LVDQ\WKLQJEXWDWKUHVKROGWHVW2QWKHFRQWUDU\WKHSUHFLVH
LQTXLU\DWWKH¿UVWVWDJHLVZKHWKHUWKHODZGUDZVDIRUPDOGLVWLQFWLRQ
³EHWZHHQWKHFODLPDQWDQGothers.´>HPSKDVLVDGGHG@

+H WKHQ SURFHHGV WR FDVW GRXEW RQ WKH LGHDV XQGHUSLQQLQJ WKH
UHVSRQGHQWV¶FODLP
$VFLWL]HQVKLSZDVUHFRJQL]HGDVDQDQDORJRXVJURXQGLQAndrews,FDQ
¿QGQRDXWKRULW\IRUTXDOLI\LQJWKLV¿QGLQJDFFRUGLQJWRWKHFRQWH[WRI
DJLYHQFDVH7KHSRLQWRIWKHDQDORJRXVJURXQGVDFFRUGLQJWRLawDQG
VXEVHTXHQWFDVHVLVWKDWWKH\DUH³VXVSHFWPDUNHUV´RIGLVFULPLQDWLRQ
WKH JURXSV RFFXS\LQJ WKHP DUH YXOQHUDEOH WR KDYLQJ WKHLU LQWHUHVWV
RYHUORRNHGQRPDWWHUZKDWWKHOHJLVODWLYHFRQWH[W

,Q WKLV SDUDJUDSK %DVWDUDFKH - VKRZV FOHDUO\ KLV XQZLOOLQJQHVV WR
UHFRJQL]HDUHDVRILPPXQLW\ZKHUHWKHJURXQGVRIGLVFULPLQDWLRQGRQRW
DSSO\:KLOHKHGRHVQRWH[SOLFLWO\RYHUUXOHWKHGHFLVLRQLQ ChiarelliKH
QHYHUWKHOHVVFDVWVJUDYHGRXEWVRQWKHFRQWLQXLQJDXWKRULW\RIWKHUHDVRQLQJ
RQ ZKLFK LW LV EDVHG 0F/DFKOLQ &-¶V VRPHZKDW FDVXDO UHIHUHQFH WR
ChiarelliDQGKHUGHYHORSPHQWRIWKHDSSURDFKIRXQGWKHUHLQLJQRUHVWKLV
6KHGRHVQRWHYHQFLWHWKHLavoieGHFLVLRQLQKHUMXGJPHQW
,WVKRXOGEHDGGHGWKDWLQCharkaoui, 0F/DFKOLQ&-DOVRLJQRUHVKHU
RZQZRUGVLQKHUGLVVHQWLQJRSLQLRQLQLavoie ZKHUHVKHVWDWHV
3DUOLDPHQWQHHGQRWFKRRVHEHWZHHQOHJLVODWLQJZLWKUHVSHFWWRFLWL]HQVKLS
DQGGLVFULPLQDWLRQ5DWKHULWLV3DUOLDPHQW¶VWDVNWRGUDIWODZVLQUHODWLRQ
WRFLWL]HQVKLSWKDWFRPSO\ZLWKV  7KLVOHDYHVDPSOHVFRSHIRUWKH
H[HUFLVHRIWKHFLWL]HQVKLSSRZHUVRORQJDV3DUOLDPHQWGRHVQRWPDNH
GLVWLQFWLRQV WKDW XQMXVWL¿DEO\ YLRODWH KXPDQ GLJQLW\ Law supra :H
FDQQRWDJUHHWKDWGH¿QLQJ&DQDGLDQFLWL]HQVKLSUHTXLUHVWKDW3DUOLDPHQW
EHDOORZHGWRGLVFULPLQDWHDJDLQVWQRQFLWL]HQV

+HUH 0F/DFKOLQ &- RIIHUV QR UHDVRQV ZK\ ZH VKRXOG GLVWLQJXLVK
EHWZHHQODZVWKDWGH¿QHKRZFLWL]HQVKLSPD\EHREWDLQHGDQGODZVWKDW
GH¿QH WKH ULJKWV WKDW DWWDFK WR FLWL]HQVKLS +HU GHPDQG WKDW 3DUOLDPHQW
GUDIWFLWL]HQVKLSODZVWKDWFRPSO\ZLWKVHFWLRQVKRXOGEHUHJDUGHGDV
FDWHJRULFDO
,,, The Tension between &KDUNDRXL and later equality jurisprudence
,WVKRXOGDOVREHHPSKDVL]HGWKDWWKHCharkaoui/ChiarelliDSSURDFKGRHV
QRW¿WVPRRWKO\ZLWKHTXDOLW\GRFWULQHIRXQGLQPRUHUHFHQWFDVHV3RVW
Charkaoui GHFLVLRQV SODFH ZHLJKW RQ WKH IDFWRUV WKDW , KDYH QRWHG LQ
 IbidDWSDUD
 IbidDWSDUD
 IbidDWSDUD

,PPLJUDWLRQ;HQRSKRELDDQG(TXDOLW\5LJKWV



my analysis of Law and Lavoie. While the court has dispensed with the
tripartite schema developed in Law and has condensed it into a two-part
test, this change does nothing to reduce the friction.52 Emphasis on the
centrality of a conception of substantive, as opposed to formal, equality
has increased the dif¿culty of continuing to maintain a preliminary ¿lter
that permits laws dealing with immigration to be immune from section 15
challenge.
For example, in Withler53 the court attempts to simplify the
jurisprudence by stating:
At the end of the day there is only one question: Does the challenged
law violate the norm of substantive equality in s. 15(1) of the Charter?”54

The court offers an analysis of substantive equality that suggests that
it would be quite appropriate to inquire whether xenophobic antipathy is
reÀected in our laws, including our immigration laws, and their impacts:
The analysis at the second step is an inquiry into whether the law works
substantive inequality, by perpetuating disadvantage or prejudice, or by
stereotyping in a way that does not correspond to actual characteristics
or circumstances.55

In Quebec (Attorney General) v. A,56 the Court goes on to unpack the
concept of substantive equality as follows:
substantive equality is not denied solely because a disadvantage is
imposed. Rather, it is denied by the imposition of a disadvantage that is
unfair or objectionable, which is most often the case if the disadvantage
perpetuates prejudice or stereotypes.57

The Court then quotes Sophia Moreau:
We think of discrimination not just as any sort of differential treatment
but as a particular kind of differential treatment: to be discriminated
against is not just to be denied something that others have but to be
denied it in a way that is objectionable or unfair.58 [emphasis added]

52. The jurisprudence establishes a two-part test for assessing a s 15(1) claim: (1) Does the law
create a distinction based on an enumerated or analogous ground? (2) Does the distinction create a
disadvantage by perpetuating prejudice or stereotyping? See R v Kapp, 2008 SCC 41 at para 17.
53. Withler, supra note 43.
54. Ibid at para 2.
55. Ibid at para 65.
56. AG v A, supra note 41.
57. Ibid at para 180.
58. Ibid.
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WKH¿OWHULQJSURFHVVLQWKH¿UVWSDUWRIWKHWHVWVKRXOGQRWEHWRRULJLG,W
VD\V
7KHUROHRIFRPSDULVRQDWWKH ¿UVWVWHSLVWRHVWDEOLVKD³GLVWLQFWLRQ´
,QKHUHQWLQWKHZRUG³GLVWLQFWLRQ´LVWKHLGHDWKDWWKHFODLPDQWLVWUHDWHG
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7KH&RXUWWKHQSLFNVXSRQWKHLGHDVXJJHVWHGLQLavoieWKDWFRPSDULVRQ
EHWZHHQ JURXSV VKRXOG RFFXU DW WKH VHFRQG VWDJH RI WKH LQTXLU\ ZKLFK
KDGEHHQWKHWKLUGVWDJHXQGHUWKHLaw IUDPHZRUN DQGVKRXOGEHKLJKO\
FRQWH[WGHSHQGHQW
7KHDQDO\VLVDWWKHVHFRQGVWHSLVDQLQTXLU\LQWRZKHWKHUWKHODZZRUNV
VXEVWDQWLYHLQHTXDOLW\E\SHUSHWXDWLQJGLVDGYDQWDJHRUSUHMXGLFHRUE\
VWHUHRW\SLQJLQDZD\WKDWGRHVQRWFRUUHVSRQGWRDFWXDOFKDUDFWHULVWLFV
RU FLUFXPVWDQFHV At this step FRPSDULVRQ PD\ EROVWHU WKH FRQWH[WXDO
XQGHUVWDQGLQJ RI D FODLPDQW¶V SODFH ZLWKLQ D OHJLVODWLYH VFKHPH DQG
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WKHFLUFXPVWDQFHV>HPSKDVLVDGGHG@

 Withler, supra QRWHDWSDUDV
 IbidDWSDUD
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In the immigration context, this might involve considering the
differences between citizens and non-citizens when deciding that a
particular part of the regime is substantively unjust.
IV. Jurisprudence that supports Charkaoui
Despite the friction between Charkaoui and Chiarelli on the one hand,
and leading jurisprudence on the other, it must be noted and conceded that
there is a strain of jurisprudence with which they are more compatible.
The jurisprudence includes a case in which McLachlin J. (as she then was)
dissents vigorously. The cases in question deal with the provincial funding
of separate schools and decide that a particular sphere of legislation is
insulated from Charter review. It should be noted at the outset that in these
cases, unlike Chiarelli and Charkaoui, it is not held that the laws withstand
Charter challenge because they are not discriminatory. The reasons for the
decision are more basic. Nevertheless, these cases should remind us that
Charkaoui and Chiarelli are not unique or extraordinary in their attempts
to immunize laws from Charter review.
The ¿rst case is Reference Re Bill C-3061 in which Wilson J. introduced
the idea that a wide range of legislative measures may be insulated from
Charter challenge. The case concerned legislation in Ontario that was
to extend provincial funding to Roman Catholic Separate Schools. The
Ontario Government argued that the Bill was a justi¿able exercise of
power under s. 93 of the Constitution Act.62
Amongst the arguments mounted against the legislation was the
argument that, by providing Roman Catholic schools with ¿nancial
bene¿ts not made equally available to other taxpayers and other religious
schools, Bill 30 violated the equality guarantee in s. 15(1) of the Charter.
In response, the Ontario Government argued that such law was insulated
from Charter challenge by section 29 of the Charter.63

61. [1987] 1 SCR 1148, 40 DLR (4th) 18 [Bill C-30].
62. Section 93 reads: “In and for each Province the Legislature may exclusively make Laws in
relation to Education, subject and according to the following Provisions:
(1) Nothing in any such Law shall prejudicially affect any Right or Privilege with respect to
Denominational Schools which any Class of Persons have by Law in the Province at the Union….
(3) Where in any Province a System of Separate or Dissentient Schools exists by Law at the
Union or is thereafter established by the Legislature of the Province, an Appeal shall lie to the
Governor General in Council from any Act or Decision of any Provincial Authority affecting
DQ\5LJKWRU3ULYLOHJHRIWKH3URWHVWDQWRU5RPDQ&DWKROLF0LQRULW\RIWKH4XHHQ V6XEMHFWVLQ
relation to Education…” The Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982
(UK), 1982, c 11.
63. Section 29 provides, “Nothing in this Charter abrogates or derogates from any rights or
privileges guaranteed by or under the Constitution of Canada in respect of denominational, separate or
dissentient schools.” Charter, supra, note 19, s 29.
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UHOLJLRXVVFKRROVWKHSURYLQFHGLVFULPLQDWHGDJDLQVWWKHODWWHURQWKHEDVLV
RIUHOLJLRQFRQWUDU\WRV  ,DFREXFFL-IRUWKHPDMRULW\LQAdler QRWHG
WKDW:LOVRQ-KDGIRXQGWKDWWKHSURSRVHGOHJLVODWLRQ
ZDVQRQHWKHOHVV³LPPXQH´IURP&KDUWHUUHYLHZEHFDXVHLWZDV³OHJLVODWLRQ
HQDFWHGSXUVXDQWWRWKHSOHQDU\SRZHULQUHODWLRQWRHGXFDWLRQJUDQWHGWR
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,DFREXFFL-FRQFOXGHG
)ROORZLQJWKHVDPHOLQHRIUHDVRQLQJXVHGE\:LOVRQ-LQWKHReference
Re Bill 30,¿QGWKDWSXEOLFIXQGLQJIRUWKHSURYLQFH¶VVHSDUDWHVFKRROV
FDQQRWIRUPWKHEDVLVIRUWKHDSSHOODQWV¶Charter FODLP

0F/DFKOLQ - DV VKH WKHQ ZDV  LQ KHU SDUWLDO GLVVHQW UHMHFWHG WKLV
DQDO\VLV
%HIRUH FRQVLGHULQJ WKH Charter LVVXHV LW LV QHFHVVDU\ WR GHWHUPLQH
ZKHWKHU V  RI WKH Constitution Act, 1867 FRQVWLWXWHV D FRGH ZKLFK
RXVWVWKHRSHUDWLRQRIWKHCharter,DJUHHZLWK6RSLQND-WKDWLWGRHV
QRW6HFWLRQUHTXLUHV2QWDULRWRIXQGVFKRROVIRUWKH5RPDQ&DWKROLF
PLQRULW\LQ2QWDULRDQGUHTXLUHV4XHEHFWRIXQGVFKRROVIRUWKH3URWHVWDQW
PLQRULW\LQ4XHEHF1HLWKHULWVODQJXDJHQRULWVSXUSRVHVXJJHVWVWKDWLW
ZDVLQWHQGHGWRGRPRUHWKDQJXDUDQWHHVFKRROVXSSRUWIRUWKH5RPDQ
&DWKROLF RU 3URWHVWDQW PLQRULWLHV LQ WKH WZR SURYLQFHV UHVSHFWLYHO\





Bill C-30, supra, QRWHDWSDUDV
Adler v Ontario>@6&5>Adler@
IbidDWSDUD
IbidDWSDUD
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Provinces exercising their plenary powers to provide education services
must, subject to this restriction, comply with the Charter.68

There is good reason to believe that Wilson J.’s analysis is no longer
good law although it has never been formally repudiated. First, in
Lavoie, Bastarache J. explicitly rejected an argument that jurisdictional
considerations are relevant when determining whether the Charter
applies.69 Moreover, in EGALE Canada v. Canada,70 the British Columbia
Court of Appeal refused to apply Wilson J.’s analysis in a context other
than the funding of separate schools, and emphasized the unique position
that that issue held in constitutional history.71
The school funding cases are helpful because they indicate that there
may be laws that are insulated from Charter review because they are
merely recognizing rights, as the Constitution demands. A challenge that
demanded that citizens should not enjoy rights—like the right to enter
or stay in Canada—that non-citizens do not enjoy would likewise fail.
But in Adler, McLachlin J. makes a strong case that this does not entail
that we should establish excessively broad areas of immunity where the
Charter would not apply. Nevertheless, this seems to be the upshot of
the decision in Charkaoui. In Adler, McLachlin J. proposes that claimants
be permitted to make arguments in accord with the criteria set out in the
equality jurisprudence. Their permitted challenge would nevertheless fail
both where it is found that the law does not discriminate against them but
also where the government shows that the discrimination is demonstrably
justi¿able in a free and democratic society. In Adler, McLachlin J. found
that Ontario had done just that.
V. Xenophobia and immigration law
My critique of the Charkaoui/Chiarelli analysis goes beyond the mere
existence of friction created when one tries to ¿t it within the more general
doctrines of equality established elsewhere. By denying a section 15
challenge to non-citizens where the law imposes an unfair disadvantage
on them that is not imposed on citizens, the Charkaoui/Chiarelli doctrine
68. Ibid at para 194.
69. Lavoie, supra note 37 at para 40.
70. 2003 BCCA 251.
71. Ibid. The Court stated, at para 109: “What is apparent from these passages, and from the judgment
of Wilson J. as a whole, is that the reason s. 93 was immune from Charter review was because of a preconfederation compromise (“bargain”) designed to protect the Roman Catholic minority in Ontario
and the Protestant minority in Quebec. This compromise, which carried with it certain built-in rights
(and inequalities), was entrenched in the Constitution Act, 1867. Section 29 of the Charter did not
grant the right to immunity from Charter review under s. 15 or otherwise; it simply recognized and
preserved the rights conferred by s. 93 in their historical context.”
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leaves few other options to the claimants. One option is to attempt to
subsume the claim under another section of the &KDUWHU. However, there
will be many cases of comparative disadvantage that will not meet the tight
requirements of other sections. For example, the strict criteria that de¿ne
cruel and unusual treatment will exclude many forms of abusive behaviour
that reveal that the individual is not considered as an equal. In addition, as
noted above, non-citizens have had only limited success in getting courts
to recognize that the immigration process engages the right to life liberty
and security of the person and even where they have been successful in
this regard the challenge of showing that the principles of fundamental
justice have been infringed has been a dif¿cult one. Moreover, the harm
recognized by section 15—that it is an assault on one’s personality or
identity to suffer the ignominy of treatment that indicates that one is less
worthy as a human being as others who are under the law’s authority—is
quite different from those recognized in the other sections.
A second option is to argue one’s case as an equality case but to
compare one’s treatment with that accorded to other groups of non-citizen.
This option is premised on the idea that the law lives up to our equality
principles within the realm of immigration by allowing a successful claim
only when different rules are applied to different groups who must also
negotiate their way through them. It is only where one can show that
one is treated as a less valuable human being than other non-citizens that
one’s equality rights will have been infringed. This idea should be met
head on. By accepting it, one is implicitly denying that xenophobia is and
throughout our history has been a social problem that surfaces regularly and
that demands legal recognition. My primary critique of &KDUNDRXLhinges
on the ideais that it fails to acknowledge the existence of xenophobia and
its possible inÀuence on our laws and misrepresents the nature of the harm
suffered. The proposition that our laws have treated some non-citizens
unequally because it has failed to accord them the same bene¿ts accorded
to other non-citizens is quite different from the proposition that the law
has treated some non-citizens unequally because it has treated them as less
worthy of respect than the citizenry.
The important point to note is that xenophobic measures need not
uniformly oppress all non-citizens in the same way. Although some groups
of non-citizen may be able to escape the application of a particular rule,
this does not show that the rule is not an instantiation of a xenophobic body
of law. As is emphasized in judicial statements about substantive equality,
the discovery of formal differences in treatment amongst subgroups need
not lead to the conclusion that the measure should not be identi¿ed as an
instantiation of a more general assault on the whole group. It is for this
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reason that is both misleading and unsatisfactory to require non-citizens
within the immigration regime to show that differential treatment is being
imposed on different groups of non-citizen in speci¿c situations. Their
complaint is not that some other non-citizens have escaped the unfair
disadvantagement. Excessively harsh rules and over-inclusive rules may
be created and implemented KDSKD]DUGO\ with little concern about the
effect. Laws that impose hardship on only one subgroup of non-citizens
may be passed by a populist government anxious to curry favour with
xenophobic groups. By ill-treating non-citizens in such a fragmented and
possibly arbitrary way the government may be able to show its disdain for
non-citizens as a whole. Where a legal regime variably imposes burdens
on non-citizens from different countries, it does not engage in multiple
acts of discrimination against different subgroups. It engages in a more
profound act of discrimination against the whole.
Once we have entered a realm in which the distinction between
citizen and non-citizen has been made, and once we acknowledge that
non-citizens are subject to intermittent, sporadic forms of ill treatment, our
inquiry should cease to focus on ¿nding comparator groups. The primary
issue is ZKHWKHUWKHLQGLYLGXDOKDVEHHQWUHDWHGPRUHKDUVKO\WKDQKHRU
VKHVKRXOGKDYHEHHQ We can use the criteria of substantive equality and
the criteria from section 1 when making this inquiry. We should not impose
any further comparative element. We distort the nature of the claim when
we require litigants to show that they are worse off than other non-citizens.
The case of 7DELQJR72 may cast light on the idea that requiring
non-citizens to show that they are treated differently from other noncitizens ignores an important egalitarian concern. This case focused on
discrimination DPRQJ immigrants. It concerned a statutory measure which
provided that applications for permanent residence as a member of the
federal skilled worker class made before 27 February 2008 were to be
terminated unless an of¿cer had made a selection decision before 29 March
2012. The applicants had applied for permanent resident visas before 27
February 2008. They had been waiting many years for their applications to
be processed but they were in fact cancelled, and noted that the processing
was slower in some visa of¿ces. They argued that the measure in question
violated their s.15 rights. A large part of the decision focused on the issue
whether &KDUWHUrights vest in non-citizens outside Canada, but this should
not concern us here (although it should concern us).
In the Federal Court, the applicants framed their challenge in terms that
alleged that the measure discriminated against them on grounds of either
72.

7DELQJRVXSUDnote 22.
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country of residence or national origin. Thus, the court was not asked to
consider whether the measure in question is a manifestation of a general
xenophobic antipathy that surfaces from time to time. While Rennie J. is
happy to concede that national origin is an analogous ground for the claim,
he ¿nds that country of residence is not. He sums up his reasons thus:
When determining whether grounds of discrimination are analogous
to those listed in section 15, courts should consider whether the
characteristics at issue have historically served as “illegitimate and
demeaning proxies for merit-based decision making” and whether the
distinction being drawn affects a “discrete and insular minority or a
group that has been historically discriminated against”….
It is doubtful that country of residence could be an analogous ground.
Country of residence is not an immutable characteristic, nor is it vital
to identity, given the applicants’ willingness to immigrate. Nor are the
applicants a discrete and insular minority, and certainly not such a group
within Canadian society. Country of residence, in contrast to race and
religion, does not have the same historical antecedence of being a basis
for discrimination, nor is there suf¿cient evidence that would establish
that residence is an illegitimate or demeaning proxy for merit-based
decision making. Accordingly, I ¿nd that country of residence is not an
analogous ground of discrimination under section 15 of the &KDUWHU and
turn to the applicants’ argument based on national origin.73

The passages reveal the dif¿culty that non-citizens face if we remove
the opportunity to rely on their mere status of non-citizens. Any ground that
they may select as analogous will likely be based on a distinction found
in the law or created by the application of the law, in this case, country
of residence. But such a distinction may lack the historical pedigree to
convince the judge that it can give rise to a discrimination claim. When we
have no historical experience with this type of distinction we do not even
reach the stage of determining the substance of the claim.
Ultimately Rennie J. found that the measure in question did not
discriminate on the basis of national origin. This decision was upheld
in the Federal Court of Appeal74 which dealt with the equality issue
quite cursorily noting that that there was a rational explanation for slow
processing in some visa of¿ces that had nothing to do with discrimination.
At neither level of court was the obvious question addressed: *LYHQ
WKDWZDLWLQJWLPHVDUHGLIIHUHQWLQGLIIHUHQWSDUWVRIWKHZRUOG IRUYDOLG
UHDVRQV GRHVLWVKRZHTXDOFRQFHUQDQGUHVSHFWWRDOODSSOLFDQWVZKHQ
RQHXQLIRUPO\XVHVWKHVDPHFXWRIIGDWHIRUFDQFHOODWLRQ"
73.
74.

,ELG at paras 112-114.
,ELG
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It is also useful to examine a second recent case, Canadian Doctors,75
where MacTavish J offers a perceptive account of recent section 15
jurisprudence. The case concerned the constitutional validity of two Orders
in Council that denied basic health care coverage to refugee claimants
from designated countries. MacTavish J.’s careful analysis leads her to
conclude that the orders discriminated on the grounds of national origin.
However, she baulks at ¿nding that the laws are discriminatory on more
general grounds. She considers the argument that the laws discriminate
on the basis of “immigration status” and concludes that she is bound by
an earlier Federal Court of Appeal decision that immigration status is not
analogous to the grounds identi¿ed in section 15.76 In Toussaint v Canada77
Stratas J.A. had stated:
In my view, the appellant has failed to demonstrate that the Order in
Council makes a distinction based on any enumerated or analogous
ground that is relevant to her situation. …The primary distinction is said
to be between foreign nationals possessing certain immigration status
who are covered under the Order in Council, and other foreign nationals
who possess another immigration status who are not covered….Further, I
do not accept that “immigration status” quali¿es as an analogous ground
under section 15 of the Charter, for many of the reasons set out in Corbière
v. Canada (Minister of Indian and Northern Affairs), 1999 CanLII 687
(SCC), [1999] 2 S.C.R. 203 at paragraph 13, recently approved by the
Supreme Court in Withler, supra at paragraph 33. “Immigration status”
is not a “[characteristic] that we cannot change.” It is not “immutable
or changeable only at unacceptable cost to personal identity.” Finally
“immigration status”—in this case, presence in Canada illegally—is a
characteristic that the government has a “legitimate interest in expecting
[the person] to change.” Indeed, the government has a real, valid and
justi¿ed interest in expecting those present in Canada to have a legal
right to be in Canada.78

While it is beyond the scope of this paper to consider the merits of
the conclusion that differentiations among foreign nationals cannot be
discriminatory, the more general conclusion that “immigration status” is
not an analogous ground because it is not immutable must be questioned.
It should ¿rst be noted that neither Corbière nor Withler addresses the
question of immigration status. They merely re-iterate the need to
show that the relevant characteristic is “immutable or changeable only
at unacceptable cost to personal identity.” Stratas J.A.’s account of
75. Canadian Doctors, supra note 7.
76. Ibid at para 870.
77. Toussaint v Canada (Attorney General), 2011 FCA 213.
78. Ibid at para 99.
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immigration status as mutable runs counter to common experience—it
is notoriously dif¿cult for the bulk of the world’s population to change
its immigration status. It also runs counter to the more lax analysis of
immutability found in Andrews, where status as a non-citizen is identi¿ed
as an analogous ground. It is unfortunate that MacTavish J.’s location in
the judicial hierarchy precluded her from addressing this point or from
extrapolating further from her analysis of the more general jurisprudence.
Yet another recent decision reveals some negative effects of requiring
non-citizens to use more speci¿c grounds of discrimination than their noncitizen status. In YZ,79 the applicants alleged that denying an appeal to the
Refugee Appeal Division of the IRB to refugee claimants from designated
countries of origin (DCOs) violated section 15. Refugee claimants from
other countries had access to the appeal process.
Referring to the ¿rst part of the Withler two-part test, Boswell J.
decided that a differentiation had been made on the ground of national
origin. Turning to the second part of the test, he argued:
The distinction drawn between the procedural advantage now accorded
to non-DCO refugee claimants and the disadvantage suffered by
DCO refugee claimants under paragraph 110(2)(d.1) of the IRPA
is discriminatory on its face. It also serves to further marginalize,
prejudice, and stereotype refugee claimants from DCO countries which
are generally considered safe and “non-refugee producing.” Moreover, it
perpetuates a stereotype that refugee claimants from DCO countries are
somehow queue-jumpers or “bogus” claimants who only come here to
take advantage of Canada’s refugee system and its generosity…
The introduction of paragraph 110(2)(d.1) of the IRPA has deprived
refugee claimants from DCO countries of substantive equality vis-à-vis
those from non-DCO countries. Expressly imposing a disadvantage on the
basis of national origin alone constitutes discrimination (Andrews at 174;
Withler at paragraph 29), and this distinction perpetuates the historical
disadvantage of undesirable refugee claimants and the stereotype that
their fears of persecution or discrimination are less worthy of attention.80
[emphasis added]

In order to ¿nd that there has been discrimination in this case, Boswell
J, is forced to maintain that claimants from a DCO alone are subject to
the stereotype of being queue jumpers. But in actuality, this stereotype
was being launched more generally at all arrivals who were not waiting
overseas to be resettled. When the measures designating countries of
origin were introduced, other over-inclusive measures to discourage
79.
80.

YZ, supra note 5.
Ibid at para 124.
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fraudulent refugees were also introduced. These measures had an impact
on all refugee claimants, reducing the times to prepare for hearing and
access to humanitarian and compassionate process and the Pre-Removal
Risk Assessment. The justi¿cation offered by Boswell J. while laudable
in effect, offers a partial account of the contextual evidence and wrongly
implies that refugee claimants from non-designated countries were not
being slighted nor subject to the same abusive stereotypes.
This arti¿cial analysis could have been avoided had Boswell J.
conceded that the imposition of restrictive conditions on refugees from
DCOs was but one assault amongst many that were targeting refugee
claimants in general. We should not look for distinctions amongst the
victims who have been violated by different attacks. We should instead
recognize that it because they were part of the larger group of non-citizens
that they were treated with disdain and disrespect.81
Conclusion
Cases such as Tabingo and YZ should not be read in isolation. Their direct
precursors are Charkaoui and Chiarelli—cases that refuse to acknowledge
that a vein of poison may have penetrated our immigration laws and may
continue to do so in the future. This failure ensures that harsh and oppressive
forms of treatment will likely be viewed as unique or isolated and directed
towards discrete groups of non-citizens rather than as indicative of a more
general and entrenched antagonism towards non-citizens as a whole. The
requirement that non-citizens ¿rst show that they are treated unfavourably
in comparison with other non-citizens, and then show that the ground of
differentiation is analogous to those listed in section 15, and then show
that the difference reveals that they are being presented as less valuable
persons than those others is a requirement that is not only dif¿cult to meet
but also one that fails to address the underlying problem—that we live in
a culture in which currently there is large-scale distrust of newcomers, and
anxiety about the changes that non-members will bring. As a consequence,
demands are made that the government treat these anxieties seriously.
In various ways and at various times, governments have revealed their
willingness to comply to such demands and in doing so, have shown
insuf¿cient concern about the collateral impacts of our immigration laws
on the individuals whose lives they shape. Since Andrews, we have
recognized this may surface as a problem outside the ¿eld of immigration
81. It should be noted that, on 17 May 2019, the Government removed all countries from the list of
those designated as safe. See Government of Canada, “Canada Ends the Designated Country of Origin
Practice,” (News Release, 17 May 2019), online: <https://www.canada.ca/en/immigration-refugeescitizenship/news/2019/05/canada-ends-the-designated-country-of-origin-practice.html>.
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